A theory of rational jurisprudence by Baker, Scott & Mezzetti, Claudio
513
[ Journal of Political Economy, 2012, vol. 120, no. 3]
 2012 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-3808/2012/12003-0004$10.00
A Theory of Rational Jurisprudence
Scott Baker
Washington University in St. Louis
Claudio Mezzetti
University of Melbourne
We examine a dynamic model of up-or-down problem solving. A de-
cision maker can either spend resources investigating a new problem
before deciding what to do or decide on the basis of similarity with
precedent problems. Over time, a decision-making framework, or ju-
risprudence, develops. We focus on the model’s application to judge-
made law. We show that judges summarily apply precedent in some
cases. The law may converge to efficient or inefficient rules. With
positive probability, identical cases are treated differently. As the court
learns over time, inconsistencies become less likely. We discuss the
existing empirical evidence and the model’s testable implications.
I. Introduction
We develop a dynamic model of up-or-down problem solving. In it, a
decision maker must devise a method for dealing with a series of prob-
lems, project proposals, or cases, with an up-or-down, yes-or-no, answer.
As matters arise, the decision maker has a choice: he can spend time
and resources investigating the merits in depth and, on the basis of the
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results, decide what to do. Alternatively, the decision maker can decide
that a case or project is “close enough” to prior cases or projects that
it can be decided similarly without additional thought. Reasoning in
this way saves on decision costs but creates the chance of error. Over
time the decision maker develops a decision-making framework, a ju-
risprudence. This paper focuses on the properties of this jurisprudence:
Will a practice of following precedent emerge? Will “like” cases or proj-
ects be treated “alike”? Under what conditions will the case law converge
to efficiency, where a party wins or a project is approved if and only if
the benefits outweigh the costs?
The problem solving we model is something many organizations must
do. Chief executive officers and venture capitalists must decide which
projects to move ahead and which projects to forgo; at the same time,
they must decide how to spend limited resources deciding which projects
go in which bin. In handling customer complaints, firms must decide
which complaints should be investigated and which ones should be
declined or approved solely on the basis of similarity to past complaints.
Although we believe there are many applications, our primary mo-
tivation is the study of judge-made law, a subject rarely studied by econ-
omists.1 In common law countries, judicial decisions set the rules for
property, govern the interpretation of contracts, and control negative
externalities through the allocation of liability. Further, because ex ante
specification of statutes is costly, legislatures often use statutory language
that includes broad phrases or terms. In antitrust, for example, section
2 of the Sherman Act imposes liability on “every person who shall mo-
nopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize.”2 In intellectual property, a
patent will not issue if the difference between the prior art and the
claimed invention would have been “obvious” at the time of the inven-
tion.3 Courts, then, fill in the law on a case-by-case basis.
In the United States, constitutional law is judge made. As a result,
judicial decisions set the ground rules for the political process and
define the state’s reach into private lives. Even in areas of law in which
agency regulation dominates (e.g., environmental law and occupational
health and safety), judges play a significant oversight role. For example,
judges review an agency’s cost-benefit analysis and can, in some sce-
narios, decide whether the agency must do cost-benefit analysis at all
(Sunstein 2001).
1 For a recent paper outlining several reasons why economists need to pay closer at-
tention to judicial behavior, see Stephenson (2009). An enhanced focus on judicial decision
making and common law evolution is also critical in light of the empirical findings of the
legal origins literature (see La Porta et al. 1998, 2004).
2 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1890).
3 35 U.S.C. § 103.
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Case-by-case adjudication differs from ex ante legislative or agency
rule making in fundamental ways. Unlike other lawmaking bodies,
judges do not announce policies. They are reactive. Generally speaking,
judges do not respond unless an injury materializes.4 The injury leads
to a complaint or case, with each case providing grounds for revising
the judge’s belief about the benefits and costs of a particular judge-
made law. In deciding cases, judges have to consider that careful ex-
amination of a case is costly. They need to select which cases are im-
portant to look at closely and which cases are not. One lesson from our
model is that this triage process—an important act in judging—has
consequences for the ultimate policy and the consistency of judicial
decision making along the way.
Just because case-by-case decision making is different from ex ante
direct regulation of behavior does not make it important. But there is
an interaction between the effectiveness of judicial decision making and
the legislature’s choice to delegate—via a vague statute—to the courts.
Detailed statutes are expensive to draft and inflexible. If judicial decision
making is likely to be poor or mistaken, the legislature should be more
willing to spend resources setting the contours of the statute in the first
place and vice versa.
Judicial decision making is likely to be poor when the court must
spend lots of resources figuring out the correct answer to the resolution
of a case.5 This might happen in complex areas of the law, such as tax.
In addition, when the judicial caseload is high, courts will react to ad-
ditional delegation (passage of another statute with vague language) by
reading prior cases “broadly.” The judge will extrapolate a great deal
from prior cases to new cases with different facts, new cases in which
the outcome of the prior case is not terribly informative. As a result,
the court will make more errors, simply as a consequence of having to
adjudicate all cases on its docket.
On the contrary, case-by-case adjudication is well suited to uncover
unintended side effects. By observing materialized injuries, judges learn
the extent of the injury before setting the doctrine. Judges can thus
incorporate this information into the doctrine, adjusting the rules over
time as more information becomes available.
To be concrete, zoning makes sure everyone knows what they can
and cannot do with their property ex ante and saves on litigation costs.
Regulation via nuisance claims, by contrast, allows for ex post consid-
erations and, thus, for better tailoring of the regulation to situation-
4 For an informal discussion of the factors making legal intervention before the harm
relatively more efficient than legal intervention after the harm, see Shavell (2004, 572–
78).
5 For a model relating judicial errors and the desirability of ex ante regulation, see
Schwartzstein and Shleifer (2011).
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specific circumstances. Which is better, or should we have a little of
both? In short, the choice of the degree of ex post versus ex ante
regulation turns on how good judicial decision making is likely to be.
The answer to that question requires an understanding of how judges
make decisions with scarce resources, a decision-making exercise that
forms the basis of our inquiry.
We do not model litigation explicitly. Instead we focus on learning
over time, with judges engaging in forward-looking cost-benefit analysis
in interpreting precedent, and what that analysis implies for the evo-
lution of law. For simplicity, we assume that judges discover the facts of
a case on their own. This is not incompatible with the typical role of
advocacy. Indeed, we could generalize the model so as to let, say, the
defendant’s lawyers argue that the relevant set of precedents is the one
leading to dismissal of the case, while the plaintiff’s lawyers argue that
another set of precedents governs, leading to the opposite conclusion.
Such an extension would shed light on the role of advocacy and case
selection, but it would not affect our conclusions on the evolution of
law. When the arguments of one party are convincing, the judge would
rule in that party’s favor on the basis of closeness with the set of prec-
edents presented; when a definite conclusion is unclear, the judge would
invest additional resources to discover which sets of precedents govern.
To our knowledge, no one has formally examined situations in which
argument strength turns on distance. Yet, in judge-made law, that dis-
tance is critical. Our model demonstrates a link between “closeness”
and the efficient deployment of resources. As resources become more
scarce, a prior case can be further away from the case at hand and still
persuade the decision maker that he should decide the case without
additional investigation.
Using a dynamic programming model, we build a theory of judge-
made law from the ground up. We assume a single court that lives
forever, consisting of judges with identical policy preferences. The
judges are initially uncertain about the consequences of legal rules and
have scarce resources to investigate cases. The theory yields both sur-
prising and intuitive results.
In the model, reliance on precedent arises endogenously. Judges fol-
low precedent, not because deviations are punished but to conserve
resources. Each period, the judge interprets the prior cases, deciding
how far to extrapolate the results from prior cases to new and different
circumstances, without engaging in any fresh investigation. Cases that
are in some sense “close” to the prior case law are decided summarily
solely on the basis of the precedent. The judge investigates cases that
are “far.” Each period, the judge decides what is close and what is far.
In making this interpretative choice, the judge balances two costs.
First, there are error costs, that is, the costs of ruling on a case incorrectly.
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Second, there are decision costs: the costs associated with a judge in-
vestigating a case in depth instead of relying on the precedent as a proxy
for what to do. We show that the optimal balancing of these costs for-
malizes the usefulness of reasoning by analogy (a skill taught to every
lawyer and judge) and, in accord with intuition, shows that reliance on
precedent will be lower in areas of law in which errors are more costly.
We next demonstrate that the judge-made law will, in general, con-
verge. This convergence will be of two types. If decision costs are small
relative to fixed-error costs, the law will converge to the efficient out-
come, or correct decision, in all cases. More interesting, if decision costs
are high relative to fixed-error costs, the law will converge to an inef-
ficient set of legal rules. Thus, for example, judge-made law will incor-
rectly specify liability for some activities in which no liability is the proper
result and no liability when liability is the right outcome. This result
obtains, even though all judges share efficiency as the goal. Convergence
here is second best: spending resources to gather more information
(i.e., hearing more cases) is not worthwhile in terms of the benefit of
a more accurate legal rule.
Finally, we explore the implications of our theory for the evolution
of law. In spite of our assumption of identical policy preferences by all
judges, we show that with positive probability the court will fail to treat
like cases alike. Cases with “identical” relevant facts may be decided
differently. Discriminatory treatment—violation of what we refer to as
the likeness principle—occurs as the court uses what it has learned to
improve the law. Judges are often vilified for treating like cases differ-
ently, actions thought unfair and inconsistent with the rule of law. The
model shows that strict adherence to the likeness principle inhibits
judicial learning and the cost-justified updating of legal rules. Violation
of the likeness principle is apt to occur when investigation of a case
yields a surprising result and, hence, teaches a great deal to the court.
We also consider whether inconsistencies will remain in the limit. The
model demonstrates that as the court learns more and more, inconsis-
tencies become less and less likely and, in the limit, vanish. Taken to-
gether, the two results suggest that inconsistencies should be observed
more often when the judge-made law is in its infancy, say, shortly after
Congress passes a statute containing broad, enabling language.
The paper unfolds as follows: related literature is reviewed in the
remaining part of this introduction. Section II develops an economic
model of legal reasoning. Section III demonstrates that precedent has
value and studies the convergence properties of doctrine. Section IV
shows that a rational court will, with positive probability, violate the
likeness principle. Section V suggests possible extensions and offers
some concluding remarks. Throughout, where applicable, we discuss
the empirical evidence consistent with the predictions of the model and
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offer testable implications. Although we believe the model covers a com-
mon decision-making phenomenon, one benefit of focusing on judge-
made law is that courts provide a wealth of data for possible future
empirical tests of the theory.
Literature review.—The model closest to ours is Gennaioli and Shleifer
(2007). Seeking an explanation for the empirical finding that a common
law legal origin correlates with various markers of development, they
build a model of judge-made law. A judge, in their model, cannot over-
rule prior cases; she can only distinguish a case by searching for a
different dimension along which to consider it. The act of distinguishing
two cases has social value because it embeds new information into the
law. Different judicial policy preferences then shape the evolution of
law. Gennaioli and Shleifer’s main result is the Cardozo theorem. It says
that the legal evolution induced by distinguishing cases will, on average,
be beneficial irrespective of the amount of bias in the judiciary. We take
a different approach. Rather than starting from the premise that judges
have conflicting policy preferences, we begin from an assumption of
scarce judicial resources. From this alternative baseline, we get insights
consistent with the institutional features of judge-made law.
Two other significant literatures relate to our work. The first is from
law and economics scholars; the second, from political science. Since
Judge Posner’s assertion that the common law is efficient (Posner [1973]
2007), the law and economics literature has sought to explain why this
might be so (Priest 1977; Rubin 1977; Bailey and Rubin 1994; Hylton
2006). Both Posner’s assertion about efficient common law and the
models exploring it have been sharply contested (Hadfield 1992; Bailey
and Rubin 1994; Hathaway 2001). The literature has blossomed, with
many factors pointing toward and against efficiency (Zywicki 2003; Kler-
man 2007; Parisi and Fon 2008). This literature is distinct from what
we do here. Case selection drives the law in these models, with judges
playing little role. Ours is not a story about litigants selecting specific
cases for trial and that selection dictating the path of the law. Rather,
we ask what evolution to expect when judges are forward looking and
have the ability to learn but are resource constrained.
There are a few exceptions to the litigant-selection story about the
evolution of law. Cooter, Kornhauser, and Lane (1979) and Hadfield
(2011) develop models in which the court can learn and ask whether
rules will adapt to new circumstances or converge to efficiency. Unlike
our model, the question of how to optimally deploy judicial resources
over many periods is not examined. Dari-Mattiacci, Deffains, and Lovat
(2011) develop a dynamic model in which the litigants bring infor-
mation to the courts, and the courts issue decisions. The number of
judicial decisions implies more “precedent”; distinct from us, judges do
not interpret prior case law in their model.
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Political scientists assume that judges, like legislators, make decisions
to advance their preferred policy objective.6 Learning does not occur,
and the informational value of precedent is not explored. In contrast,
we show how the shifting interpretation of precedent can be seen as a
method of efficiently managing resources to learn about the proper
structure of legal rules. These aspects of judicial behavior have not, to
our knowledge, been formally studied elsewhere.
II. A Model of Legal Reasoning
In creating law case by case, judges mix the information from prior
cases with the facts from new cases. If the new facts indicate that, as
stated, the legal doctrine no longer serves its function, the judge can
distinguish the prior case law and reach an alternative resolution.7 To
capture this process, suppose a judge wishes to regulate a set of activities,
. Activity x carries costs and benefits, and there is a thresholdx  [0, 1]
below which an activity is socially valuable and above whichv  [0, 1]
it is not. The threshold point v is initially unknown. We model it as a
random variable distributed according to with positive densityF(v)
on . The restriction of activities to the unit interval is withf(v) [0, 1]
some loss of generality. At a higher level of abstraction, an activity might
be represented as an element in a multidimensional space.8 Our as-
sumption requires that each multidimensional activity can be reduced
to a single number and ranked against all other activities (i.e., the social
value of activity 1 is lower than that of activity , which is lower than3/4
that of activity ). It is akin to the common assumptions that guarantee1/2
the existence of a utility function in consumer theory.9 Given this or-
dering, finding the set of socially valuable, or efficient, activities reduces
to locating v, the activity whose social value is zero.
As noted in the introduction, the court consists of a single infinitely
6 For a model in which a judge makes decisions anticipating the likely position of
Congress or the executive, see Eskridge and Ferejohn (1992). For a model in which the
judge is influenced by other judges sitting on the panel, see Spitzer and Talley (2011).
For a model in which judges face constraints imposed by the likely position of the higher
court, see Songer, Segal, and Cameron (1994) and McNollgast (1995). For a model in
which judges interact repeatedly over time, see O’Hara (1993).
7 Levi (1949, 7–19) contains the classic discussion of common law reasoning.
8 The assumption that the region of uncertainty is bounded is not important. It will be
used when we work with a uniform distribution but could be dispensed with in the general
model.
9 Completeness, transitivity, and continuity are sufficient; they guarantee that activities
associated with nearby real numbers have nearby characteristics from the point of view
of case law. Since judges have identical preferences, they collapse the fact space into a
single dimension in the same way and rank the resulting bundles the same.
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lived judge with constant preferences.10 The judge prefers to allow ben-
eficial activities and deter harmful ones. When presented a case, the
judge can either fully investigate or summarily examine it. “Summarily”
in this model means spending less effort on the case, for example, by
resolving the case with an unpublished decision or one-line order.
Full investigation costs C and is rewarded: the judge discovers whether
undertaking activity x is efficient, that is, whether it carries a positive or
a negative social value.11 The judge reports what he has learned in an
opinion. Summary examination, by contrast, is costless but might result
in an incorrect decision.
Full investigation means studying the facts. It requires the court and
the litigants to spend time and resources uncovering the relationship
between the new facts and broader social policies, using all the judicial
tools (oral argument, additional briefing, reading the scholarly litera-
ture, closely examining expert reports, etc.). Investigation costs are likely
to be high in technical fields, like tax, environmental harms, and food
and drug safety. In these areas, the parties must provide and the judge
must assess complicated testimony and materials to see the likely con-
sequences of ruling for the plaintiff or the defendant. Overall caseload
also affects decision costs. As caseloads go up, the judge’s opportunity
cost of investigating any single case increases. As we shall see, using
caseload as a proxy for decision costs enables us to derive testable pre-
dictions from the model and link the theoretical results to the empirical
literature on judicial decision making.
Two types of potential mistakes are associated with summary exami-
nation. The court might erroneously declare a socially beneficial activity
impermissible or a socially harmful activity permissible. Mistakes in ad-
judication result in two kinds of losses. There is a variable loss Fx
, which depends on the distance between the activity and v, and avF
fixed-error loss L, which does not depend on the distance. The variable
loss captures the idea that the further away the activity is from the
threshold v, the higher is the social loss from a mistaken decision. The
fixed-error loss captures a discontinuity in the social value of activities.
Judges care about perception, both from the public and from the other
branches. In many cases, the public, for example, is unlikely to under-
stand the difference between a “small” mistake and a “big” mistake and
calibrate its reaction to the court decision accordingly. As a result, one
10 The conclusion suggests an alternative interpretation of the model, consisting of two
courts in a hierarchy in which the upper court must decide how many cases whose outcome
is uncertain to delegate to the lower court to resolve.
11 It simplifies the analysis to assume that there is no noise or mistake in the discovery
process and that the judge correctly determines whether an activity is efficient upon its
full investigation. The assumption that decision costs are constant seems a reasonable first
approximation; it is not immediately apparent whether investigation costs are lower or
higher, the closer is x to v.
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might think about the fixed-error cost as the discrete loss arising from
the court making the wrong call.12
Error costs are likely to be high when other actors lack the capacity
or will to correct judicial mistakes. Three examples are constitutional
cases, when the courts have the final say about what the constitution
requires; cases when interest group conflict is rampant and, as a result,
Congress rarely acts; and court decisions on the scope of a mandatory
rule, that is, a rule that cannot be contracted around.
A. Timing and the Construction of Precedent
Each period, a case x is randomly selected from the interval ac-[0, 1]
cording to the distribution with positive density and broughtG(x) g(x)
to the attention of the court.13 Let denote the highest activity or factWt
pattern that the court has, as of time t, heard, fully investigated, and
found acceptable, that is, of positive social value. Let denote theR t
lowest activity or fact pattern that the court has fully investigated and
found unacceptable, that is, of negative social value. Prior case law, in
other words, has taught that allowing activities in the interval is[0, W ]t
efficient, while allowing activities in is inefficient. The two end-[R , 1]t
points and squeeze the court’s beliefs about the distribution of v.W Rt t
The range of activities the court knows nothing about is .(W , R )t t
Each period, the court decides, on the basis of prior precedent (i.e.,
looking at and ), which cases to look closely at and which cases toW Rt t
decide summarily. Cases that are in some sense close to the prior prec-
edent are decided summarily on the basis of the precedent alone. Cases
that are in some sense far from prior precedent are investigated. The
court can easily determine the proper resolution of cases below andWt
above since the prior precedent is perfectly informative about them.R t
The court summarily declares permissible any case below and im-Wt
permissible any case above . On these cases, the judge expends noR t
decision costs and makes no errors. For cases in the interval ,(W , R )t t
12 Nothing in the model turns on including a fixed cost. Assuming that there is a fixed
social loss from error stacks the deck in favor of efficient convergence. As noted above,
a major claim in the law and economics literature is that judge-made law is efficient.
Inefficiency is easily shown if the only social loss of incorrect decisions is the variable loss,
which shrinks as activities get closer to v. With a constant decision cost, investigation
would, over time, become less and less worthwhile (the benefit of preventing mistakes
would fall, while the cost remains constant). In the long run, judge-made law would surely
admit errors. Interestingly, as we shall see, with a fixed-error cost component convergence
to inefficient rules can occur still.
13 In specifying that the court always draws facts from the same distribution, we abstract
away from the law’s impact on behavior. We do this to ease the analysis and focus on
judicial learning. The assumption is a reasonable first approximation, so long as parties
make mistakes about the contours of the law when deciding their actions or face a small
probability of getting caught and sued.
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the court determines how broadly or narrowly to construe past prece-
dent. Reading precedent broadly means that the court decides a high
percentage of new cases by extrapolating or reasoning by analogy from
past cases without further inquiry (i.e., lots of cases are determined to
be close to the precedent). Given the greater extrapolation, the chance
is higher that the prior cases will be off point and lead the judge to a
mistaken resolution. Reading precedent narrowly is the opposite.
The interpretative decision determines two bounds, and . Thesea bt t
bounds partition the interval of uncertainty into three areas.(W , R )t t
The first area is the interval . In this interval, the judge fully[a , b ]t t
investigates the case. The second and third areas are and(W , a )t t
. If a case lies in either of these intervals, the judge feels the(b , R )t t
activities are close enough to prior case law ( and ) as to be decidedW Rt t
by application of precedent alone without spending effort. Activities in
are declared permissible; activities in are declared im-(W , a ) (b , R )t t t t
permissible. The size of these two intervals measures how expansively
the judge reads the prior precedent
If the judge investigates and learns that the activity in the case has
positive value, she writes an opinion and updates the precedent stock
( ). Likewise, if the judge investigates and finds the activity toW 1 Wt1 t
have negative value, she updates the precedent stock accordingly
( ). If the new case is summarily examined, the court learnsR ! Rt1 t
nothing, and the precedent stock remains constant.
As an example motivating our model, consider punitive damage
awards in tort cases. The Supreme Court has the power to strike down
punitive awards set by lower courts as violating the due process clause
of the Constitution.14 The legal issue is how much is too much—what
multiple of compensatory damages renders the award unconstitutional.
Suppose awards range between 0 and 1,000 times the compensatory
award. Imagine the first case the Supreme Court hears involves a pu-
nitive award of 500 times the compensatory award. The court investi-
gates, finds this multiple too much, and strikes the award down. In the
language of the model, the court learns that . Itv ! 500/1,000 p .5
writes an opinion saying so, setting .R p .5t
Suppose that the next case involves a multiple of 100. The court might
interpret its prior case to also cover this case and summarily strike down
the award (setting ). In so doing, the court broadly construes itsb p .1t
own precedent. Such a move saves resources but might be wrong. If the
ideal rule v lies in the interval , the court will have made a mistake.(.1, .5)
Now suppose instead that the second case has a multiple of 450. Striking
this award down summarily is less likely to generate a mistake. It only
does so if v happens to be in the interval . Because of the close-(.45, .5)
14 See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
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ness between the 450 case and the 500 precedential case, relying on
precedent saves resources without unduly increasing error costs. In our
model, in each period the judge interprets precedent to balance the
two costs, while understanding that the investigation today benefits fu-
ture judges because it reveals information about the optimal legal rule.15
B. The Optimization Problem
We can now write the dynamic optimization problem that the court
must solve. Let d be the discount factor and be the court’sV(W , R )t t
value function at time t, with state variables . The court choosesW , Rt t
the interpretative bounds subject to to maximizea , b W ≤ a ≤ b ≤ Rt t t t t t
its expected discounted payoff:
V(W , R ) p max dEV(W , R ) C[G(b ) G(a )] (1)t t t t1 t1 t t{
W ≤a ≤b ≤Rt t t t
a x R Rt t t tLf(v) Lf(v)
 dvg(x ) dx  dvg(x ) dx  t t   t tF(R ) F(W) F(R ) F(W)W W t t b x t tt t t t
a x R Rt t t t
(x  v)f(v) (v x )f(v)t t dvg(x ) dx  dvg(x ) dx .  t t   t t}F(R ) F(W) F(R ) F(W)W W t t b x t tt t t t
The second term is the expected cost of having to decide a case in
period t. For example, if , then the court construes the priora p bt t
precedent as deciding the law for all activities and does not incur any
decision costs at time t. The greater the distance between and , thea bt t
greater the chance a case is drawn in which the court views the law as
unsettled by prior precedent and is willing to expend effort.
The third and fourth terms reflect the expected one-period losses due
to the fixed-error component L, while the fifth and sixth terms reflect
the expected losses due to the variable error component . Con-Fx vF
sider the third and fifth terms. If the judge sets , there is a chancea ≥ Wt t
that the case drawn, , is between and . For cases in this gap, thex W at t t
court will base its decision solely on the prior precedent and rule sum-
marily that the activity is permissible. The expression f(v)/[F(R )t
is the probability the court attaches to the possibility that v is lessF(W)]t
15 This example is drawn from the case law. See Pacific Mutual Life Ins. C. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 23–24 (1991), finding that a ratio of 4:1 between punitive damages and compensatory
damages was not excessive; TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resource Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462
(1993), noting that a 10:1 ratio between the punitive award and the harm if the illicit plan
had succeeded would not “jar one’s constitutional sensibilities”; B.M.W., Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 582 (1996), finding that an award of 500 times the actual harm was grossly excessive;
and State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003), finding
that an award of 145:1 was an “irrational and arbitrary deprivation of the property of the
defendant.” For other examples of this kind of evolution of law, see Niblett (2010a).
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than . In that event, creates a social loss; the court has made ax xt t
mistake in its summary ruling. The fourth and sixth terms follow from
a similar analysis on the upper region of the interval of uncertainty;
here, precedent induces the court to rule the activity as impermissible
but, in fact, it is socially valuable.
The first term in (1) is the discounted expectation of the value of
the court’s objective function at the end of period t, given its interpre-
tative choices at time t. This term captures the dynamic learning con-
siderations described above. It can be written explicitly as the sum of
three components:
EV(7) p V(W , R ){1 [G(b ) G(a )]}t t t t t
bt F(x ) F(W )t t V(W , x ) g(x ) dx (2) t t t tF(R ) F(W)a t tt
bt F(R ) F(x )t t V(x , R ) g(x ) dx . t t t tF(R ) F(W )a t tt
The first component is the current value function times the probability
that no learning takes place because the randomly selected activity x is
outside the interval of investigation . The second component is[a , b ]t t
the expected value function when the case x is brought to court, in-
vestigated, and determined to be above v; in such an instance, the new
interpretative interval becomes . The third component is the[W , x ]t t
expected value function when x is discovered to be below v.
A special version of the model is when the distributions andF(v)
are both uniform. This version has the advantage of simplifyingG(x)
the analysis; only the size of the interval mattersD p R W (W , R )t t t t t
to the court when deciding the interpretative bounds. It is convenient
to express the objective function of the court as a function of the pro-
portion of cases in the interval that the court considers permissiblea Dt t
and the proportion that it considers impermissible after summarybt
investigation:
a Wt t
a p ,t
Dt
R  bt t
b p .t
Dt
Thus, the proportion of cases in that are investigated is .D 1 a  bt t t
It is immediate that the following restrictions must hold: , ,a ≥ 0 b ≥ 0t t
. We will use this uniform version of the model in the1 a  b ≥ 0t t
remainder of the paper. The Appendix shows that the main results and
insights extend to the general version.
Lemma 1 in the Appendix proves that the value function forV(D )t
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the uniform version exists, is unique and continuously differentiable,
and can be written as
L 2 2V(D ) p max C(1 a  b)D  (a  b )Dt t t t t t t{ 2a ≥0,b ≥0,1ab ≥0t t t t
 3 3 2 (a  b )D  dV(D )[1 (1 a  b)D ] (3)t t t t t t t6
1a 1bt t
 d V(D x )D x dx  d V(D x )D x dx . t t t t t  t t t t t}
a bt t
Lemma 1 also shows that is negative and decreasing in D, withV(D)
V(0) p 0.
III. The Value of Precedent and the Convergence of Doctrine
The most narrow construction of precedent in period t sets (a , b ) pt t
, or . In so doing, the court maximizes the learning(W , R ) a p b p 0t t t t
that case load provides by looking at every possible case in which the
resolution is uncertain; each of these cases carries a bit of information
about the location of v. If the decision cost C of looking at a case is
sufficiently small relative to the error losses, L and , should the court
not use all the information potentially available in each period, setting
? As we shall see in this section, while this approach seemsa p b p 0t t
like a good idea, it never is, no matter how small C is relative to L and
.
Proposition 1 shows that the constraints and never binda ≥ 0 b ≥ 0t t
if —that is, a positive proportion of cases is always summarily ex-D 1 0t
amined. It also proves that the solution is symmetric, . The courta p bt t
always relies on precedent and never investigates every case in the in-
terval of uncertainty . However, the constraint mayD 1 a  b ≥ 0t t t
bind; when this happens , and no cases are fully investi-a p b p 1/2t t
gated. In legal terms, the court construes the prior precedent as covering
all potential future cases.
Define the precedent ratio as the proportion of cases in the intervall t
of uncertainty that will be ruled by precedent in period t :Dt
l p a  b .t t t
As the bounds and get closer together for a given level of uncertainty,a bt t
increases, meaning that the court decides a higher proportion ofl t
cases by reference to precedent alone.
Proposition 1. There exists such that in each period tl(D ) 1 0t
when the interval of uncertainty is , the court choosesD a p b pt t t
and thus selects a precedent ratio bounded away froml /2 ≥ l(D )/2 lt t t
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zero. The precedent ratio is an increasing function of and a de-l Ct t
creasing function of , , and .16L  dt t t
Proof. Define
1 L 
a 2 3 2V (D ) p C  a D  a D  a Dt t t t t t t( )2 2 6
1at1 1
 dV(D )   a D  d V(D x )D x dx ,t t t  t t t t t[ ( ) ]2 2 at
1 L 
b 2 3 2V (D ) p C  b D  b D  b Dt t t t t t t( )2 2 6
1bt1 1
 dV(D )   b D  d V(D x )D x dx .t t t  t t t t t[ ( ) ]2 2 bt
The court’s objective function (3) can be written as
a bV(D ) p max V (D ) V (D ). (4)t t t
a ≥0,b ≥0,1ab ≥0t t t t
Note that does not depend on , and does not dependa bV (D ) b V (D )t t t
on . Moreover, ; that is, after switching the in-b aa V (D ) p V (D )Ft t t a pbt t
dependent variable with , the functions and are iden-a ba b V (D ) V (D )t t t t
tical. Finally, recall that is negative and decreasing in D and noteV(D)
that Note also thata blim V(D ) p lim V (D ) p lim V (D ) p 0.Dr0 t Dr0 t Dr0 t
aV  2p D C La  a D  dV(D ) d(1 a )V(D(1 a )) daV(Da ) , (5)t t t t t t t t t t t{ }a 2t
bV  2p D C Lb  b D  dV(D ) d(1 b)V(D(1 b)) dbV(D b) . (6)t t t t t t t t t t t{ }b 2t
Let , , and be the (nonnegative) multipliers on the constraintsa bm m rt t t
, , and , respectively. The first-order conditionsa ≥ 0 b ≥ 0 1 a  b ≥ 0t t t t
of program (4) with respect to and area bt t
aV (D )t a m  r p 0, (7)t t
at
bV (D )t b m  r p 0. (8)t t
bt
We now show that and (and hence ) are bounded away froma b lt t t
16 In the proof, we derive analytical solutions for the comparative statics when the
parameters C, L, , and d only change at time t. (This is why the subscript t is attached
to the parameters in the statement of the proposition.) Matlab simulations show that the
sign of each comparative statics result is the same if we vary the relevant parameter at
each point in time.
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zero. Suppose that . Then (7) and (5) implya p 0t
a0 ! DC ≤ DC m p r .t t t t
Since by complementary slackness, the constraintr 1 0 1 a  b ≥ 0t t t
must bind, and hence . As a consequence, , and, using (8)bb p 1 m p 0t
and (6)

D C L D p r ,t t t[ ]2
a contradiction since . This shows that cannot be zero. Indeed,am ≥ 0 at t
since , for “arbitrarily close” to zero it must bealim V /a p DC aar0 t t t
that and . In addition, it must be thatr  DC 1 0 b p 1 at t t t
. Since this is a contradiction,br  lim V /b p D [C L (/2)D ]t br1 t t t
must be bounded away from zero; that is, there must be a lowerat
bound such that . The argument that is boundeda(D ) 1 0 a 1 a(D ) bt t t t
away from zero is analogous.
We now show that it must be that (this also impliesa p b l 1t t t
). We have already seen that the constraints andl(D ) p 2a(D ) a ≥ 0t t t
are slack at the solution of the maximization problem in the right-b ≥ 0t
hand side of (4). Since depends only on and dependsa bV (D ) a V (D )t t t
only on , if the constraint is also slack, then (4) can beb 1 a  b ≥ 0t t t
written as
a bV(D ) p max V (D )max V (D ).t t t
a bt t
It follows from that at the optimum it must be thatb aV (D ) p V (D )Ft t a pbt t
. It remains to consider the case in which the constrainta p b 1t t
is binding. Replacing in (4) and recalling thata  b ≥ 0 b p 1 at t t t
the constraints and are slack, we can writea ≥ 0 1 a ≥ 0t t
L 2 2 3 3 2V(D ) p max  [a  (1 a ) ]D  [a  (1 a ) ]D  dV(D ) .t t t t t t t t{ }2 6at
The first-order condition gives
 2 2 2L[a  (1 a )]D  a  (1 a ) D p 0,t t t t t t[ ]2
from which we may conclude that the solution is .a p b p 1/2t t
We now derive the comparative statics results. Small changes in C, L,
, and d have no impact on in the case of a boundary l p a  bt t t
solution . Consider an interior solution. Exploiting thea p b p 1/2t t
symmetry of the solution (i.e., ) and (5) and using thea p b p l /2t t t
subscript t to keep track of the fact that we are only changing C, L, ,
and d at time t, we may write the interior first-order condition
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as17aV /a p 0t
L t t 2F(7) :p C  l  l D  dV(D )t t t t t t2 8
l l l lt t t t d 1 V D 1  d V D p 0. (9)t t t t( ) ( ( )) ( )2 2 2 2
Let be the partial derivative of F with respect to the variableF z z tt
. By totally differentiating (9), it is immediate that{C , L ,  , d }t t t t
. Since the second-order condition of the court’s max-l /z p F /Ft t z lt t
imization problem requires , the sign of is the same as theF ! 0 l /zl t tt
sign of . Observe thatFzt
F p 1 1 0,Ct
l t
F p  ! 0,Lt 2
2l t
F p  D ! 0, tt 8
l l l lt t t t
F p V(D ) 1 V D 1  V D ! 0,d t t tt ( ) ( ( )) ( )2 2 2 2
where the fourth inequality follows from being negative and de-V(D)
creasing in D.18 QED
The value of precedent, stare decisis, emerges endogenously in our
model. Proposition 1 formalizes a well-known view on precedent. As-
suming the prior judgments were correct, the court can take those
rulings as given and focus on new issues. As pointed out by Judge Ben-
jamin Cardozo, “the labor of judges would be increased almost to the
breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case,
and one could not lay one’s own course of brick on the secure foun-
dation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him” (1921,
149).
The reason the court relies on precedent is simple. At the margin,
the cost of looking at cases near the boundary of the interval of un-
17 In eq. (9), is the value function at time , which does not depend on ,V(7) t 1 Ct
, , and , the values of the parameters at time t. When the parameters, and hence theL  dt t t
value function, vary in time, lemma 1 can be extended to show existence, uniqueness,
differentiability, and negative valuedness of the value function at each point in time.
18 Since is the value function at time and , lemma 1 applies,V(D) t 1 C p C p … p Ct1 t2
and is decreasing in D. When considering a change in one of the parameters C, L, ,V(D) 
and d at each point in time, we must account for the impact of the change on the future value
function. For example, differentiating (9) with respect to yieldsC p C p C p … F pt t1 C
. Matlab1 d[V(D )/C] d[1 (l/2)][V(D  (Dl/2))/C] d(l/2)[V(Dl/2)/C]t t t t t t t t
simulations show that the sign of is the same as the sign of for all .F F z  {C, L, , d}z zt
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certainty always outweighs the expected social loss of relying on prec-
edent instead. To see this, suppose the court considers the marginal
impact of relying on precedent and setting and hencea p b p /2t t
, rather than , where  is a small number. Thel p  a p b p l p 0t t t t
probability that x is drawn from the set and hence(W , a ) ∪ (b , R )t t t t
summarily decided is , while the probability that x is in the set and
erroneously decided (i.e., in or in ) is propor-x 1 v (W , a ) x ! v (b , R )t t t t
tional to 2. It follows that the marginal benefit of relying on precedent
(i.e., the expected saving on the decision cost) exceeds the marginal
cost (i.e., the expected losses from an error and from giving up
learning), for a sufficiently small .
The narrowest possible construction or interpretation of prior prec-
edent ( ) means that the court expends effort also on cases closel p 0t
to the boundary points and , where an error is extremely unlikely.W Rt t
To tie with our motivating example, the Supreme Court investigates and
hears a case involving a multiple of 499 times the compensatory award
when it has previously found a 500 multiple impermissible. That is a
waste of judicial resources. The court is not relying enough on reasoning
by analogy, that is, extrapolating costs and benefits from similar past
cases.
These results shed light on a number of phenomena. First, the judge,
or decision maker, asks how close the case is to previous cases and, if
sufficiently close, decides according to the precedent. The model jus-
tifies this common form of analogical analysis, which is deployed in
many institutional settings. Although such reasoning conserves resources,
there are limits on how far the analogy can be pushed. Some cases are
just too different, and, as a result, the prior decision is not terribly in-
formative. Then, the analogy fails and is replaced by a fresh look.
Second, legal argument often involves statements about how close
the case is to the prior case law. In our model, the closer the case is,
the more likely the court will be to defer to the precedent rather than
take a fresh look. Given this feature, effective advocacy involves explain-
ing to the court why the case is closer to one set of precedential materials
than to a second set of precedential materials. Indeed, judges often
must decide which set of precedents more aptly apply in a new case
(Posner 2006, 763–64, quoting Radin 1925, 359). In our model, this
corresponds to deciding whether is closer to the precedent associatedxt
with or the one associated with . We assume the court knows whereW Rt t
lies on the interval, but we could expand the model to allow lawyersxt
on one side to argue that is close to the precedent case and hencex Wt t
is a valuable activity that ought to be declared permissible, while lawyers
on the other side would argue that is closer to , the other precedent,x Rt t
and ought to be impermissible.
Third, reliance on precedent occurs even when the court faces no
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penalty for failing to follow precedent. It thus provides one explanation
for why the Supreme Court defers to its own prior decisions and federal
circuit courts defer to sister circuits or state courts, when they face no
sanction for a failure to do so.
A. Precedent Ratio: The Empirical Literature and Testable Implications
Prior models of judicial decision making assume that judges do not
learn and have unchanging preferences over how to divide a factual
space into segments: permissible and impermissible (see, e.g., Kornhaus-
er 1992a, 1992b; Lax 2011, 2012). These models implicitly assume the
judge is indifferent between ruling by summary disposition or in a
lengthy opinion; they cannot explain why or when judges will find prec-
edent persuasive. They also cannot explain the existence or form of
legal argument and why closeness between the current case and prior
cases seems to matter in the law.
Our model is different. For example, by proposition 1 an increase in
C raises the court’s cost to learn about the social value of a particular
activity by investigating the merits of the case. Accordingly, it encourages
the court to reason by analogy to a greater extent and to resolve more
cases by summary disposition. This prediction is consistent with empir-
ical evidence. Huang (2011) studies the effect of increased caseloads
on the rate at which circuit courts reverse district courts. As noted, an
increase in caseload can be thought of as an increase in the decision
cost of a judge. After September 11, 2001, the attorney general made
it a priority to quickly clear the deportation backlog. This move caused
a flood of immigration appeals directly to two circuit courts. Huang
looks at reversal rates in another kind of case—civil cases—in these
jurisdictions. He finds that “when flooded by the agency cases, the af-
fected circuit courts began to reverse district court rulings less often—
in the civil cases. In these circuits, it seems, deference increased” (1115).
Enhanced deference can be viewed as greater use of summary review
by the circuit court.
On related lines, Epstein, Landes, and Posner (2011, 101) find that
“in the court of appeals, the frequency of dissents is negatively related
to the caseload.” A dissent is more likely in a published opinion in which
the judges, collectively, have spent effort looking at a case and disagree-
ments remain. Stras and Pettigrew (2010) examine a single circuit’s
response to a rising caseload. They report that, as the caseload has
increased, the Fourth Circuit “adopted certain procedural reforms to
adapt to its increased caseload. The most important and controversial
of these reforms is a reduction in the percentage of cases allotted oral
argument time and an increase in the percentage of cases decided
through unpublished opinions” (432).
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Next consider some testable implications of the comparative static on
error costs. As the cost of a mistake increases, the court is less likely to
decide by applying precedent alone and hence less likely to decide by
summary disposition. Thus, we can empirically sort cases by issue area
and then ask about the chance of summary disposition, given our ex-
pectation of the likely error cost.19 Courts, say, should be less likely to
resolve constitutional law cases without a hearing or without a written
decision—a statement that can be tested. In capital punishment cases,
the courts should routinely grant oral argument. Contract cases, by
contrast, should often be treated summarily, especially when they involve
the setting of default rules.
Finally, consider a decrease in discount factor d. Proposition 1 predicts
that judges who care less about the future should be more likely to rely
on summary disposition. Like the error cost comparative statics, this
result can be tested. Some state court judges are elected; others are
appointed for a given time period. Holding all else constant, elected
state court judges might be assumed to care less about the distant future
and learning about the proper scope of the law; as a result, they ought
to be more likely to resolve cases summarily. As noted, given the wealth
of data on judicial decision making, we believe that looking at courts
provides a nice place to test our more general theory of the mechanics
behind up-or-down problem solving.
B. Convergence
Legal academics, policy makers, and advocates often criticize the law
articulated by courts as imperfect or wrongheaded. For example, in tort
law a defendant will be found negligent if he acts without reasonable
care. The negligence standard is a knife-edge inquiry. If the defendant
is found negligent, he is liable for all the resulting damage. If he is
found nonnegligent, he pays nothing. Calfee and Craswell (1984) show
that, when the defendant is uncertain about the legal standard, negli-
gence can result in too much deterrence. The courts have not fine-
tuned negligence law to account for the risk of overdeterrence identified
by Calfee and Craswell. On this score, negligence law is imperfect.
As we shall see, our model shows that imperfections in doctrine are
inevitable when the cost of deciding cases is sufficiently high. This is
true even if the court shares the underlying values of those criticizing
the decisions. The next proposition demonstrates that the court will
eventually stop learning and will exclusively rely on precedent if and
19 Of course, any empirical test based on the chance of summary disposition must
account for the probability of filing by the litigants. Knowing that the case is likely to be
summarily resolved, the plaintiff might not file in the first place, which in turn makes
observing summary disposition less likely.
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only if . In such a case, at some point, the benefits of furtherC 1 L/2
refinement—tweaking the doctrine to better advance society’s inter-
ests—are smaller than the costs. The court, then, refuses to refine the
doctrine and lets all the new cases that come along be ruled by prec-
edent. On the contrary, if , the court will never stop learningC ≤ L/2
until it reaches perfect knowledge of the parameter v.
Proposition 2. (1) If , the law converges (with probabilityC 1 L/2
1) without the court fully learning about v; there exists a threshold value
such that the court chooses ; equivalently ( withD l p 1 a p b ( vS t t t
probability 1) when . (2) If , the court eventually fullyD ≤ D C ≤ L/2t S
learns; whenever and , andl ! 1 D 1 0 lim D p 0 lim a pt t tr t tr t
. Furthermore, .lim b p v lim l p 2C/Ltr t tr t
Proof. We know from proposition 1 and its proof that the optimal
policy is . Learning stops, and hence the law con-a p b p l /2 1 0t t t
verges without full learning when or . Replacinga p b p 1/2 l p 1t t t
the policy values on the right-hand side of (3), we seea p b p 1/2t t
that the value function when it is optimal to stop learning is
2L  6LD  Dt t2V(D ) p  D  D  dV(D ) p  . (10)t t t t4 24 24(1 d)
From (9), we know that the first-order condition at an interior solution
is . Note that . Since ,F(l , D ) p 0 lim F(l , D ) p C (L/2)l l ≤ 1t t Dr0 t t t tt
if , then it cannot be that for a “sufficiently small”C 1 L/2 F(l , D ) p 0t t
value of ; that is, there cannot be an interior solution for “small.”D Dt t
Formally, there must exist such that if ; forD F(l p 1, D ) 1 0 D ! Dt t t
, there is a corner solution . To derive the threshold suchD ! D l p 1 Dt t
that , delete the subscripts t and replace in (9):F(l p 1, D) p 0 l p 1t t
DL 
C  D dV(D) dV p 0; (11)( )2 8 2
then, insert the value function from (10) to obtain
2 2
d(6LD D ) d[3LD (D/4)]L 
0 p C  D 
2 8 24(1 d) 24(1 d)
3 2p 3(1 d)(8C 4L D) d 3LD D( )4
3 2p 12(1 d)(2C L) 3(1 d)D d 3LD D( )4
1 2p  dD  [dL (1 d)]D 4(1 d)(2C L),
4
from which we have a unique positive solution (as long as ):2C 1 L
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22[dL (1 d)] 2 [dL (1 d)]  4d(1 d)(2CL)
D p . (12)
d
Define as the threshold interval of uncertainty. IfD p min{D, 1} 2C 1S
and , then (12) defines the threshold interval of uncertainty. IfL D ≤ 1
, then the threshold is 1, the maximum size of the interval ofD 1 1
uncertainty. If , then the court sets , and no learning takesD ≤ D l p 1t S t
places.
Now consider the case and suppose, to the contrary, that there2C ≤ L
is a value at which learning stops. By (11) it must be thatD 1 0S
D 1 L SV p V(D ) C  DS S( ) ( )2 d 2 8
! V(D ),S
which contradicts the fact, established in lemma 1, that V is decreasing.
Hence, if , it is optimal to set in all periods t. With prob-2C ≤ L l ! 1t
ability , the court learns in period t, and in such a case(1 l )D [1t t
is an upper bound on the new interval of uncertainty . It(l /2)]D Dt t t1
follows that , and hence . Learninglim D p 0 lim a p lim b p vtr t tr t tr t
never stops, and in the limit the court discovers the true value of v. It
is immediate from (9) that, since (and hence ) converges toD V(D )t t
zero as t goes to infinity, it must be that . QEDlim l p 2C/Ltr t
If decision costs are greater than half the fixed cost of errors, the
doctrine stabilizes with imperfections remaining in the law.20 The court
sets without knowing the exact location of v. The court realizesa p bt t
the doctrine might not apply well in some circumstances, but correcting
those imperfections is not cost justified. As expected, if the fixed com-
ponent of the error loss is zero, imperfect convergence always happens.
In general, with imperfect convergence, the first few investigated cases
and decisions will be important to the long-run determination of which
activities are permissible and which ones are not. Because of high de-
cision costs, the courts will make inferences from the first cases inves-
tigated to cover lots of future cases (deciding those summarily). The
first cases will anchor the discussion and play a disproportional role in
the path of the law. With efficient convergence, by contrast, such an-
choring vanishes. Although we do not explicitly consider the possibility
20 Notably, there is empirical evidence inconsistent with the convergence of judge-made
law. Niblett, Posner, and Shleifer (2010) study the evolution of the economic loss rule
(the rule limiting tort damage unless the loss results in personal injury or property
damage). They find that “the doctrine has evolved in a way that cannot be easily described
as convergence to efficiency” (354). They also find that the law has become less predictable
in the last decade of their sample, as many state courts respond with their own exceptions
to the rule (354). While recent changes in state court preferences are an explanation
consistent with our model, it is quite possible that factors that we left outside our model
play an important part in explaining these findings.
This content downloaded from 130.102.042.098 on July 24, 2016 20:33:36 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
534 journal of political economy
of litigants selecting specific cases for trial, the insights from proposition
2 suggest that any such selection effects will be more important when
decision costs are large relative to the fixed-error cost. The reason is
that litigants will race to get a case on the books that anchors the law
in their favor.
As noted in the introduction, some economists speculate that the
efficiency of the common law provides a theoretical justification for the
main finding of the law and finance literature—that a common law
origin positively correlates with economic development. Our imperfect
convergence result suggests that it can be inefficient for the law to be
perfect across all cases and areas of law. That is to say, with scarce judicial
resources, we should expect judges to promulgate and then stick with
imperfect doctrines.21 This is true even if the judges care solely about
efficiency as the relevant benchmark for legal rules.
From proposition 2, it is also immediate that the court will not learn
at all as long as ; it will set or . When theD p 1 l p 1 a p b p 1/2S 1 1 1
cost of examining a case relative to the fixed and variable loss from
error is above a threshold, the court never investigates at all—no prec-
edent stock is created.22 The court summarily declares all cases below
the error-minimizing point as permissible and all cases above this1/2
point as impermissible. There is no uncertainty in the application of
law and no reason for litigants to bring cases. This suggests that, when
decision costs are high relative to error costs, direct government reg-
ulation, say, via a detailed statute, may be preferable to regulating by
litigation and the courts. We might think of the regulator spending a
fixed amount of resources locating v ex ante. The natural question is,
when are fixed expenditures better than case-by-case expenditures? In-
tuitively, fixed expenditures will not be effective if the consequences of
the regulation are unforeseeable and can only be discovered after, say,
the materialization of an injury.
The extent of the expected inaccuracy in the converged doctrine is
captured by : the interval of uncertainty beyond which the law stopsDS
being refined.23 The next proposition specifies the relationship between
the scope of the “inaccuracy” in doctrine and the parameters of the
model. The proof, which is relegated to the Appendix, follows from the
definition of after straightforward computations.DS
Proposition 3. Assuming imperfect convergence of doctrine, that
21 Note that, even when the law converges to efficiency, judge-made law will still have
errors along the way, simply because the precedent ratio is always positive.
22 After simple calculation, (12) shows that , and hence is equivalent toD ≥ 1 D p 1S
, which needs not hold even ifC ≥ (L/2) [d/(1 d)](L/32) (1/8){[d/(1 d)]L }
.L p 0
23 Because activities x are randomly drawn, the actual size of the uncertainty interval
at which learning stops is a random variable. The expected size is an increasing function
of .DS
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is, , the expected inaccuracy of the ultimate legal rule, , in-C 1 L/2 DS
creases in the decision cost C and decreases in the error losses L and
and the discount factor d.
The intuition is straightforward: an increase in the cost of examining
a case, a decrease in the loss of an error, and a reduction in the value
attached to the future all have the effect of making learning less valuable
and hence lead to greater inaccuracy in the law.
Like proposition 1, proposition 3 has testable implications. First, as
decision costs go up, judge-made law should be more likely to involve
per se rules—generalized rules that apply without consideration for the
specific circumstances. One can think of per se rules as a commitment
by the court to not investigate the merits of cases. It is well known that
per se rules allow for cheaper resolution of cases but create room for
errors (Easterbrook 1984, 14–15). That trade-off is the one formally
captured in our imperfect convergence result. Second, in times of weak
judicial budgets, judicial mistakes should be more common. Assuming
congressional reversal of judge-made decisions involving, say, interpre-
tation of a statute correlates with those decisions being mistaken, we
should observe congressional reversal increasing. Of course, Congress
makes funding decisions for the judiciary and also decides when to step
in and reverse a statutory interpretation. To do the test, one would need
an exogenous shock to decision costs of the courts, induced by an
institutional actor other than Congress, as in the Huang (2011) study
discussed before.
Taken together, propositions 2 and 3 suggest two ways to minimize
mistakes in the creation and application of law. One way, perhaps, is to
have Congress define the statute ex ante, but this will be costly, especially
if the needed information is unavailable. A second way—which turns
directly on the breath of judicial decisions—is to allocate the courts
more resources. With more resources, the court will read prior decisions
more narrowly and, as a result, make fewer mistakes, both along the
doctrinal path and once the doctrine converges.
IV. The Likeness Principle
Having derived the endogenous use of precedent and studied the con-
vergence of doctrine, this section asks a more fundamental question
about the evolution of law. Will evolution be consistent with the rule-
of-law value that like cases be treated alike, or will like cases be treated
differently?24
24 On this topic, the legal and philosophical literature is vast; see Fuller (1958), Hart
(1958), Tamanaha (2004), and McCubbins, Rodriguez, and Weingast (2010). Many influ-
ential scholars have stressed that like cases should be treated alike. See, e.g., Rawls (1971,
237–38), Dworkin (1977, 113), and Whittington (1999, 169).
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A doctrinal example demonstrates how judges might change the con-
struction of precedent over time. In New York v. Belton, a police officer
pulled over a car with four men inside.25 Smelling drugs, the officer
asked the men to get out of the car and placed them in four separate
areas on the highway. The officer proceeded to search the passenger
compartment, where he found drugs in a jacket that one of the men
had left behind. In upholding the search, the Supreme Court held that
when “a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant
of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest,
search the passenger compartment of that automobile” (460). In Thorton
v. United States, the defendant exited his car before interacting with the
police officer.26 The police officer found drugs on the defendant’s body,
handcuffed him, and placed him in the back of the patrol car. He then
searched the defendant’s car, where he found a firearm. The Thorton
court upheld the search of the vehicle. In Arizona v. Gant, the defendant
got out of his car.27 While the defendant walked from his car, the officer
arrested him for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed him, and
placed him in the back of the patrol car. A search of the defendant’s
vehicle revealed a bag of cocaine and a gun. The court found the search
impermissible under Belton. To sum up, in cases with similar, perhaps
even identical, facts (Thorton and Gant), the court read the prior case
law—Belton—as requiring different outcomes.
Inconsistent judicial decision making is well established in the legal
and political science literatures. Many empirical studies find that judges
reach outcomes at significantly different rates, depending on some mea-
sure of their political beliefs (Revesz 1997; Cross and Tiller 1998; Sun-
stein et al. 2006; Cox and Miles 2008; Boyd, Epstein, and Martin 2010).
In a study of unconscionability cases, Niblett (2010b, 4) finds that “where
the facts of cases fall within the ambit of precedent, the outcomes of
the case and the precedent are inconsistent in about 23% of the case-
precedent pairs.”
Our model shows that different policy preferences are not necessary
to generate inconsistent judicial decision making. In addition, the model
predicts lots of consistency too, as shown below. The end result is a mix
of consistent and inconsistent judicial making, depending in large part
on whether the law at issue is in its infancy.28
25 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
26 Thorton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
27 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
28 Recently, Fischman (2011) has estimated bounds on the range of inconsistency, by
studying asylum adjudication in the New York immigration courts. He finds that “a ran-
domly selected pair of judges would disagree about the disposition of a randomly selected
case at least one-quarter of the time, and perhaps as often as one-half the time” (31).
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A. Deriving the Likeness Principle
The ability to characterize precedent one way at one time and another
way at another time provides the courts flexibility, which will allow them
to incorporate new information into the law. As the next proposition
shows, if and learning occurs at time t, then with positive prob-l ! 1t
ability next period, the interpretation of precedent will vary in an in-
consistent way. To see how this will occur, suppose the case at timext1
is deemed impermissible by appealing to precedent. Now supposet 1
the case arising at time t is investigated by the court, and the activityxt
is found to be socially valuable. As a result, the court learns, and the
interval of uncertainty changes. Suppose the new investigation bounds
are such that . This is possible and, as the next propositionx ! at1 t1
will show, has positive probability of occurring. Finally, suppose the case
at time satisfies . The court will judge it sum-x t 1 x ≤ x ! at1 t1 t1 t1
marily and declare it permissible. There is inconsistency between the
decision at and the decision at . Since , activityt 1 t 1 x ≤ xt1 t1
is at least as socially valuable as activity , but is deemed notx x xt1 t1 t1
permissible at , while is deemed permissible at . The in-t 1 x t 1t1
consistency is due to the fact that at time t, the court has learned and
revised upward its estimate of where the efficiency threshold v lies.
Intuitively, inconsistency is more likely after an unexpected result of
an investigation. If is only marginally smaller than , the court expectsx bt t
the likely outcome of the investigation to be that the activity has negative
social value. Upon discovering that this is not so, that is indeed val-xt
uable, the court learns a lot and in later periods may declare permissible
activities that in the past would have been declared impermissible by
summary disposition. In addition, the magnitude of the inconsistency
depends on how much the court learns from the unexpected decision:
the more the court learns, the greater the potential magnitude. Since
the first few cases present a large opportunity for learning, we should
expect greater inconsistency early in the development of judge-made
law. Notably, the amount of inconsistency is not necessarily small and
transpiring just around the threshold, where it does not much matter
which way the court decides the case. Instead, inconsistency turns on
drawing a case close to the previous precedent boundary and having
investigation reveal an outcome contrary to the court’s intuition.
Inconsistent interpretation of prior cases that occurs with positive
probability implies a violation of the likeness principle. Formally, let
be the probability of the following event oc-Pr (b ! x ≤ x ! a )t1 t1 t1 t1
curring. The case in period is at least as socially valuable asx t 1t1
the case in period ; both cases are judged according to prec-x t 1t1
edent; is deemed not permissible; is deemed permissible. Sim-x xt1 t1
ilarly define . We say that the evolution ofPr (a 1 x ≥ x 1 b )t1 t1 t1 t1
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jurisprudence follows the likeness principle in period t if
Pr (b ! x ≤ x ! a )Pr (a 1 x ≥ x 1 b ) p 0.t1 t1 t1 t1 t1 t1 t1 t1
The next proposition shows that the evolution of jurisprudence from
a court that cares about errors and has limited judicial resources is not
always consistent with the lofty rule-of-law value that identical cases be
treated alike.
Proposition 4. If , then with positive probability the inter-l ! 1t
pretation of prior case law at time is inconsistent with the inter-t 1
pretation at time t ; that is, the likeness principle is violated at time t.
Proof. First, we show that with positive probability. An anal-a 1 bt1 t
ogous argument could be made to show that with positive prob-b ! at1 t
ability. Let . Since , andg* p 1 l p (b  a )/D l ! 1 g* 1 0 a !t t t t t t
for all g in the interval . Sincex(g) p b  gD ≤ b I* p [0, g*) v 1t t t
with positive probability, then with positive probabilityx(g) W pt1
for some , andx(g) g  I*
l lt1 t1a p W  [R W ] p x(g) [R  x(g)]t1 t1 t t1 t2 2
l t1p b  gD  [R  b  gD ] (13)t t t t t2
l lt1 tp b  gD  D  gD .t t t t[ ]2 2
It follows that as long asa 1 bt1 t
l lt t1
g ! p g**.
2(2 l )t1
Since, by proposition 1, and are bounded away from zero (i.e.,l lt t1
and ), it is a positive probability eventl ≥ l(D ) 1 0 l ≥ l[R  x(g)] 1 0t t t1 t
that in period t the selected case is with andx(g) g  [0, min{g*, g**})
. In such an event, . This shows that .v 1 x(g) a 1 b Pr (a 1 b ) 1 0t1 t t1 t
Now observe that with positive probability and nox  (b , R )t1 t1 t1
learning takes place, so that , , , ,W p W a p a b p b R p Rt t1 t t1 t t1 t t1
and . It follows that with positive probability .D p D a 1 bt t1 t1 t1
We conclude the proof by showing that Pr (b ! x ≤ x ! a ) 1t1 t1 t1 t1
. First, note that with positive probability at time , an activity0 t 1
is selected in the interval , where is a constantx (b , b  mD ) m 1 0t1 t1 t1 t
to be defined later. The activity is judged as being not permissible,xt1
and the court does not learn. Since , then with positive probabilityl ! 1t
at t, the selected activity is some , with , which isx(g) p b  gD g 1 0t1 t
investigated and viewed as efficient. Then, as shown in (13), the court
will set , and with positivea p b  gD  (l /2)[(l /2)D  gD ]t1 t1 t t1 t t t
probability . Since , a sufficient condition fora 1 b x ! b  mDt1 t1 t1 t1 t
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the event isx ≤ x ≤ at1 t1 t1
l lt1 tb  mD ! b  gD  D  gDt1 t t1 t t t[ ]2 2
or, equivalently,
l lt1 t
m g !  g . (14)[ ]2 2
Since and are bounded away from zero, it is possible to choosel lt t1
a set of values and having positive probability measure andg 1 0 m 1 0
such that (14) holds. This concludes the proof that the likeness principle
is violated at t when . QEDl ! 1t
Development economists and legal scholars recommend the adoption
of rule-of-law values across countries. Surprisingly, and contrary to the
conventional wisdom, proposition 4 suggests that treating like cases
alike, one of the central ingredients of the rule of law, is not always
socially optimal in the short run and should not always be expected
from a rational, benevolent court system. The benefits of nondiscrim-
ination must be traded off against learning. The court could avoid treat-
ing like cases differently by consistently construing precedent in the
narrowest way. But, as explained in proposition 1, this interpretative
approach taxes judicial resources, without enough of an offsetting ben-
efit from what can be learned from the case.
Our model does not take into account some costs of inconsistent
decision making. Predictability allows parties to engage in long-run
plans, without fear that an activity deemed permissible today will be
found impermissible tomorrow. The ability to plan, then, facilitates “law-
specific” investment, by providing for settled expectations about the
legal system. For example, inconsistent changes in the relevant tort
standard may induce a firm not to invest on the production line of a
newly designed product. We do not therefore question the general value
of a reliable legal system. What our model shows is that full predictability
comes with a price tag—costly judicial investigation of cases close to the
prior case law.
Having established that inconsistencies can occur in the short run,
the next question is whether they will persist throughout time. Will the
law oscillate with, say, activities deemed permissible and then imper-
missible and then permissible again as time goes by?29 First, it is obvious
29 In our model, standards, in effect, harden into rules. We do not speak to oscillation,
where standards turn into rules and back into standards. Such movement might be in-
corporated into the model by assuming that the location of v changes with some probability
each period. On this type of oscillation more generally and the convergence of rules and
standards, see Rose (1988), Johnston (1991), Schauer (2003), and Baker and Kim (2011).
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that if learning eventually stops, so too will inconsistency. Inconsistency
requires adjustments of the beliefs about the location of v. If the court
stops investigating, it will never update its beliefs.
What if learning never stops? Recall that to generate inconsistent
decisions at time t three events must occur. First, the case at time t
must be in the portion of the interval of uncertainty where the1 Dt1
judge makes a summary decision. Second, the case at time t must be in
the portion of the interval of uncertainty where the judgeD p Dt t1
investigates the case. Third, the case in period must be summarilyt 1
decided inconsistently with the case at time . As time goes by andt 1
the court learns, the interval of uncertainty converges to zero. It follows
that the probability of inconsistent decisions vanishes, and hence the
likeness principle holds in the limit. Formally, we say that the limit likeness
principle holds if
lim [Pr (b ! x ≤ x ! a )Pr (a 1 x ≥ x 1 b )] p 0.t1 t1 t1 t1 t1 t1 t1 t1
tr
As we have informally argued, the following proposition holds.
Proposition 5. The optimal evolution of doctrine satisfies the limit
likeness principle.
Proof. If , then by proposition 2 , and henceC 1 L/2 lim l p 1tr t
. If , then by proposition 2lim a p lim b C ≤ L/2 lim a ptr t tr t tr t
. Hence, in both caseslim b p vtr t
lim Pr (b ! x ≤ x ! a ) p lim Pr (a 1 x ≥ x 1 b ) p 0.t1 t1 t1 t1 t1 t1 t1 t1
tr tr
With the use of a simple continuity argument, observe that if the limit
likeness principle holds, then, given any finite number of periods n and
any arbitrarily small probability mass , the probability that the inter-
pretation of precedent at time t is inconsistent with the interpretation
of precedent in any of the previous n periods becomes less than  as t
grows large. The probability of an inconsistent interpretation at t with
any of the previous n periods goes to zero in the limit.
B. Testable Implications of Inconsistent Judicial Decision Making
Combined, propositions 4 and 5 lead to several testable implications.
First, as noted, one would expect to observe more inconsistency when
judge-made law is in its infancy—say, shortly after Congress passes a
statute containing a broad delegation of authority to the courts. This
prediction can be run in a horse race against the preference-based
account of judicial decision making, the dominant account. If incon-
sistency is solely the result of different judicial preferences, the length
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of time between the passage of the enabling statute and the amount of
inconsistent decision making should not be significant.30
Second, under our model the same judge can be inconsistent over
time. To the extent that one finds judges switching their own positions
in the application of the legal standard, this is evidence in favor of our
model and against a preference-based model of judicial decision making
(unless, of course, one claims that a judge’s preferences change over
time, a claim that would make the preference-based model untestable).
Third, our model suggests that inconsistent dispositions should be
more likely after a surprise decision. To test this, one might take an
opinion that caught the legal commentators off guard—an unexpected
resolution of a legal issue. Then, one might find a set of cases previously
decided summarily, say, by unpublished decision or the denial of cer-
tiorari (a form of summary disposition), and ask whether courts in
subsequent cases with roughly similar facts granted oral argument or
resolved the case with a written opinion.31
Fourth, our model predicts a higher probability of inconsistency be-
tween two unpublished decisions or a published decision and an un-
published decision than between two published decisions. Again, if ju-
dicial preferences were the sole driver of inconsistency, the form of
resolution should not make a difference to the amount of inconsistency.
Finally, the inconsistency result can be linked back to the motivating
example involving the constitutional limit on punitive damages. In 1991
in Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, the court found constitutional an
award with a ratio of 4:1 between punitive damages and compensatory
damages.32 In 1993, the court in TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resource Corp.
found that an award of 10:1 passed constitutional muster.33 Suppose
that, between 1991 and 1993, the court failed to grant certiorari and
allowed a circuit court decision to stand striking down an award of 6:
1. That, in our model, would be evidence of inconsistency. Likewise, in
1996 in B.M.W., Inc. v. Gore, the court found an award of 500:1 grossly
excessive.34 In 2003, the court found an award of 145:1 grossly excessive
in State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell.35 To test for incon-
30 Niblett (2010b) provides some suggestive evidence of the sort we envision. In the
unconscionability cases, he finds that “the level of inconsistency in the system, on average,
continues to increase until about the 100th case. After this, the level of inconsistency
falls—quite dramatically” (27). Niblett finds also that conflicting judicial politics is a good
predictor of inconsistency (30). As explained above, unlike our model and as a matter of
theory, judicial preferences alone cannot explain why the amount of inconsistency varies
over time.
31 A certiorari is a formal request to a court (in this example, the Supreme Court)
challenging a legal decision of an administrative tribunal, judicial office, or organization.
32 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
33 TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resource Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
34 B.M.W., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
35 State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
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sistency, one might search for cases between 1996 and 2003 in which
the court summarily resolved a case (i.e., denied certiorari) in which a
circuit court had upheld an award with a multiple between 145 and 499.
V. Conclusion
We believe the results derived here are applicable to any situation in
which decision makers learn from experience and make yes-or-no de-
cisions on a case-by-case basis. Take a frontline employee deciding how
to deal with grievances by his subordinates. He must decide which griev-
ances should be sent up the chain of command and which should not.
Suppose he refers the first grievance up the chain. That decision es-
tablishes a precedent. The next grievance he encounters requires re-
flection on how close that grievance is to the previous one. If the two
are close, the frontline employee saves resources by simply following
precedent, rather than investigating the pros and cons of sending that
specific grievance to his superior. But there is risk of a mistake. Perhaps
the second grievance is one that he should handle. The same results
follow in this situation as in the model—the endogenous following of
precedent, inconsistent decisions, the failure to always treat like cases
alike, and the making of rules that stick, despite the decision maker
realizing the rules work improperly in some circumstances.
Turning back to judge-made law, a few remarks are in order. In con-
trast to what is done here, the nonformal legal literature on this topic
often speaks of judges “writing” broadly or narrowly (Sunstein 1999,
10). In reality, of course, both the writing judge and reading judge play
a role in the creation of judge-made law. The writing judge might use
expansive language in the opinion to signal something to future judges
or lower courts about what he learned from his investigation and about
how the precedent could be applied in future cases. Here, such signaling
is unnecessary because the prior judges never make mistakes upon in-
vestigation and opinions perfectly convey the investigation results.
The model might be extended to include judges with different pref-
erences and opinions containing mistakes in transmission. The inter-
esting insights from this extension would come from the distortions to
the interpretation of precedent that the current judge may introduce
in order to counteract the unwanted effects on the law of a future judge
with different policy preferences. What is surprising is that our model
has descriptive power, while maintaining the strong assumption that
judges share the same normative commitments. For instance, optimal
deviations from the likeness principle arise even when nothing about
judicial preferences or the underlying environment has changed.
In addition, the model is framed in terms of a single infinitely lived
judge. Instead, one might interpret the model in terms of a judicial
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hierarchy, where the upper court has high decision costs. To economize
on these costs, the upper court hears some cases in the interval of
uncertainty. It then delegates other cases close to its prior decisions to
the lower court, which has low decision costs. The interpretative choice,
then, becomes how many cases to delegate. This interpretation of the
model makes some headway in explaining both the degree of delegation
and the reason lower courts defer to higher court precedents (deference
occurs because the higher-court decisions result from investigation and,
as a result, are correct). A delegation-style model of this sort bears
resemblance to recent work by Ellison and Holden (2010).
One final worthwhile extension would be to endogenize the decision
of which cases are brought before the court. For example, it could be
that one party, say the party interested in the activity being declared
permissible, is in a stronger position to bring cases to court. The court
will then tend to see a biased sample of cases, and it is natural to
conjecture that the court will want to skew its reliance on precedent
against the stronger party, in order to facilitate learning.
We conclude by stressing that our model reflects what judges claim
to be doing: (1) looking at facts, (2) surveying prior precedent for
guidance about what to do, and (3) trying to reach the best result.
Notably, many of the features we observe in judge-made law flow as a
natural consequence of judges doing what they say they are doing.
Appendix
First, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the value function of the court’s
maximization problem; then, we prove proposition 3; and finally, we show that
propositions 1 and 2, proven in the main body for the uniform model, extend
to the general model.
Lemma 1. In the uniform model, the value function is continuouslyV(D)
differentiable, negative valued, decreasing in D with , and uniquelyV(0) p 0
defined by
L 2 2V(D ) p max C(1 a  b)D  (a  b )Dt t t t t t t{ 2a ≥0,b ≥0,1ab ≥0t t t t
 3 3 2 (a  b )D  dV(D )[1 (1 a  b)D ] (A1)t t t t t t t6
1a 1bt t
 d V(D x )D x dx  d V(D x )D x dx . t t t t t  t t t t t}
a bt t
Proof. Recalling that and and using (1) and (2),a D p a W b D p R  bt t t t t t t t
we can write the court’s objective function for the uniform version as
This content downloaded from 130.102.042.098 on July 24, 2016 20:33:36 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
544 journal of political economy
L 2 2V(D ) p max C(1 a  b)D  (a  b )Dt t t t t t t{ 2a ≥0,b ≥0,1ab ≥0t t t t
a Rt t2 2(x W ) (R  x )t t t t  dx   dx  dV(D )[1 (1 a  b)D ] t  t t t t t2D 2DW t b tt t
R b D R b Dt t t t t ty W R  yt t t t d V(y W ) dy  d V(R  y ) dy . t t t  t t t}D DWa D t Wa D tt t t t t t
Changing the variable of integration from to in the thirdy x p (y W )/Dt t t t t
integral and to in the fourth integral yieldsx p (R  y )/Dt t t t
L 2 2V(D ) p max C(1 a  b)D  (a  b )Dt t t t t t t{ 2a ≥0,b ≥0,1ab ≥0t t t t
 3 3 2 (a  b )D  dV(D )[1 (1 a  b)D ]t t t t t t t6
1b 1at t
 d V(D x )D x dx  d V(D x )D x dx . t t t t t  t t t t t}
a bt t
Rearranging, we obtain (A1).
We now show existence, uniqueness, and differentiability of the value function.
Recall that and note that . Let S be the metric space ofD [0, 1] V(0) p 0
continuously differentiable, real-valued functions . Let the metricq : [0, 1]r 
on S be . Define the operator T mapping0 1 0 1r(q , q ) p sup Fq (D) q (D)FD[0,1]
the metric space S onto itself as follows:
D L 2 2Tq(D) p max C(1 a  b) (a  b )t t t t{1 d(1D) 2a≥0,b≥0,1ab≥0
1a 1b
 3 3 (a  b )d dq(D)(a b) d q(Dx)x dx d q(Dx)x dx . (A2)  }6 a b
Interpreting q as an initial value-function guess, the mapping T associates to q
an updated guess . The value function V defined in (A1) is a fixed point ofTq
the mapping T. (The parameter is obtained by moving theD/[1 d(1D)]
term from the right- to the left-hand side of [A1] and then dividingV(D)d(1D)
both sides by .) We now show that T is a contraction mapping, and1 d(1D)
hence V exists and is unique (and continuously differentiable). We apply Black-
well’s theorem (see Blackwell 1965; Stokey and Lucas 1989, 54). We need to
show that T satisfies monotonicity and discounting. (1) Take for0 1q (D) ≤ q (D)
all . It is immediate that , and hence monotonicity0 1D [0, 1] Tq (D) ≤ Tq (D)
holds. (2) To see that discounting also holds, let z be a nonnegative constant
map defined by for all . Let the map be defined byz(D) p z D [0, 1] q z
. We need to show that for some(q z)(D) p q(D) z T(q z)(D) p Tq(D) gz
:g (0, 1)
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D L 2 2T(q z)(D) p max C(1 a b) (a  b ){1 d(1D) 2a≥0,b≥0,1ab≥0
 3 3 (a  b )D d(q(D) z)(a b)
6
1a 1b
 d [q(Dx) z]x dx d [q(Dx) z]x dx  }
a b
D L 2 2p max C(1 a b) (a  b ){1 d(1D) 2a≥0,b≥0,1ab≥0
1a
 3 3 (a  b )D dq(D)(a b) d q(Dx)x dx6 a
1b
dz 2 2 2 2 d q(Dx)x dx dz(a b) [(1 a)  a  (1 b)  b ] }2b
2 2 2 2Ddz (1 a  2a) a  (1 b  2b) b
p Tq(D) a b[ ]1 d(1D) 2
dD
p Tq(D) z.
1 d(1D)
Since , this proves that dis-dD/[1 d(1D)] p 1/{1 [(1 d)/dD]} (0, 1)
counting holds and hence that T is a contraction. Its unique fixed point is the
continuously differentiable value function V.
To see that V is negative and decreasing, consider the set of continuously′S
differentiable functions that are negative valued and decreasing (i.e., such that
and ). The set is a closed subset of S. We need to show that′ ′q(D) ≤ 0 q (D) ≤ 0 S
T maps onto itself. Then we can conclude that the fixed point of T, the value′S
function V, is negative valued and decreasing (e.g., see corollary 1 to the Con-
traction Mapping Theorem in Stokey and Lucas [1989, 52]). First, it is immediate
from (A2) that if , then . Hence, T maps negative functionsq(D) ≤ 0 Tq(D) ≤ 0
into negative functions. It only remains to show that T maps decreasing functions
into decreasing functions. Suppose is decreasing and differentiate (A2) atq(D)
the solution values to obtaina , b∗ ∗
Tq(D) 1 d 1 d(1D)
p Tq(D)2 { }D [1 d(1D)] D
D  3 3 ′  (a  b ) dq (D)(a  b )∗ ∗ ∗ ∗{1 d(1D) 6
1a 1b∗ ∗
′ 2 ′ 2 d q (Dx)x dx d q (Dx)x dx ≤ 0,  }
a b∗ ∗
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where the first term in curly brackets is equal to the term in curly brackets in
(A2) and the inequality follows from all terms being negative. QED
Proof of proposition 3.—Recall that is implicitly defined byDS
1 2J(7) :p dD  [dL (1 d)]D  4(1 d)(2C L) p 0.S S4
Since , the sign of the impact on of a change in exogenous variableJ/D ! 0 DS S
is given byz {C, L, , d} J/z.
It is immediate that , , and ; hence, is increasingJ/C 1 0 J/L ! 0 J/ ! 0 DS
in C and decreasing in L and . Moreover,
1 2J/d p D  (L )D  4(2C L)S S4
1
p [J D  4(2C L)]s
d
1
p [D  4(2C L)].s
d
Recall from (12) that
22[dL (1 d)] 2 [dL (1 d)]  4d(1 d)(2C L)
D p ,S
d
and hence the sign of is the same as the sign ofJ/d
22[dL (1 d)] 2 [dL (1 d)]  4d(1 d)(2C L) 4d(2C L),
which is negative since
2[dL (1 d)]  4d(1 d)(2C L) ! [dL (1 d)] 2d(2C L).
It follows that is decreasing in d. QEDDS
We now consider the general model and provide sketches of the proofs of
lemma 1 and propositions 1 and 2; the proofs of propositions 4 and 5 only
require minor modifications (e.g., keeping track of the fact that it is no longer
true that ) and are omitted.a p b p l /2t t t
Lemma 1G. The value function is continuously differentiable andV(W , R )t t
negative valued, with .V(0) p 0
Proof sketch. Let S be the metric space of continuously differentiable, real-
valued functions , where . Define the operator2q : D r  D p {(x, y) [0, 1] : x ≤ y}
T mapping the metric space S onto itself as follows:
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1
Tq(W , R ) p max dq(W , R ){1 [G(b ) G(a )]}[F(R ) F(W)]t t t t t t t t{[F(R ) F(W)]W ≤a ≤b ≤Rt t t t t t
b bt t
 d q(W , x )[F(x ) F(W)]g(x ) dx  d q(x , R )[F(R ) F(x )]g(x ) dx t t t t t t  t t t t t t
a at t
 C[G(b ) G(a )][F(R ) F(W)] (A3)t t t t
a x R Rt t t t
 Lf(v) dvg(x ) dx  Lf(v) dvg(x ) dx  t t   t t
W W b xt t t t
a x R Rt t t t
 (x  v)f(v) dvg(x ) dx  (v x )f(v) dvg(x ) dx .  t t t   t t t}
W W b xt t t t
The value function V defined in (1) is a fixed point of the mapping T. To
apply Blackwell’s (1965) theorem (i.e., show existence of V), we must show that
T satisfies monotonicity and discounting. Monotonicity is immediate since
for all implies . To see0 1 0 1q (W , R ) ≤ q (W , R ) (W , R ) D Tq (W , R ) ≤ Tq (W , R )t t t t t t t t t t
that discounting also holds, let z be a nonnegative constant map defined by
for all . Let the map be defined byz(W , R ) p z (W , R ) D q z (qt t t t
We must show thatz)(W , R ) p q(W , R ) z. T(q z)(W , R ) p Tq(W , R ) gzt t t t t t t t
for some . The equality holds for sinceg (0, 1) g p d
T(q z)(W , R )t t
1
p max d[q(W , R ) z]{1 [G(b )G(a )]}[F(R ) F(W )]t t t t t t{[F(R ) F(W )]W ≤a ≤b ≤Rt t t t t t
bt
 d {[q(W , x ) z][F(x ) F(W )] [q(x , R ) z][F(R ) F(x )]}g(x ) dx t t t t t t t t t t
at
a xt t
C[G(b )G(a )][F(R ) F(W )] Lf(v) dvg(x ) dxt t t t   t t
W Wt t
R R a xt t t t
 Lf(v) dvg(x ) dx  (x  v)f(v) dvg(x ) dx  t t   t t t
b x W Wt t t t
R Rt t
 (v x )f(v) dvg(x ) dx p T(q z)(W , R ) dz.  t t t t t}
b xt t
Now consider the set of continuously differentiable functions that are negative′S
valued. It is immediate to conclude that the value function V is negative valued
since T maps onto itself: implies . QED′S q(W , R ) ≤ 0 Tq(W , R ) ≤ 0t t t t
The following first-order conditions are obtained by differentiating (1) with
respect to and , with multiplier associated to the constraint anda b h a ≤ bt t t t t
multipliers associated to constraints and :a bm , m W ≤ a b ≤ Rt t t t t t
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atF(a ) F(W ) (a  v)f(v)t t t0 p C L   dv dV(W , R ) t tF(R ) F(W ) F(R ) F(W )t t W t tt
aF(R ) F(a ) F(a ) F(W ) (h  m )t t t t t t dV(a , R )  dV(W , a )  . (A4)t t t tF(R ) F(W ) F(R ) F(W ) g(a )t t t t t
RtF(R ) F(b ) (v b )f(v)t t t0 pC L   dv dV(W , R ) t tF(R ) F(W ) F(R ) F(W )t t b t tt
bF(R ) F(b ) F(b ) F(W ) (h  m )t t t t t t dV(b , R )  dV(W , b )  . (A5)t t t tF(R ) F(W ) F(R ) F(W ) g(b )t t t t t
Proposition 1G. In each period t, the court chooses and .a 1 W b ! Rt t t t
Proof sketch. Suppose, to the contrary, that . Equation (A4) be-a p W ! Rt t t
comes , which can only be satisfied if . Then (A5) be-aC p (h  m )/g(a ) b p at t t t t
comes , which canRt bC L  {(vW )f(v)/[F(R ) F(W )]} dv p (h  m )/g(b )∫W t t t t t tt
only be satisfied if . This contradicts . Hence, it must be thatb p R b p a p Wt t t t t
whenever .a 1 W W ! Rt t t t
Similarly, suppose . Then (A5) becomes , which re-bb p R 1 W C p (h m )/g(a )t t t t t t
quires , while (A4) becomes Rta p b CL  {(a  v)f(v)/[F(R ) F(W )]}dv p∫Wt t t t tt
, which requires , a contradiction. Hence, it must be thata(h m )/g(a ) a p W b !t t t t t t
whenever . QEDR R 1 Wt t t
Proposition 2G. (1) If , the law converges (with probability 1) with-C 1 L/2
out the court fully learning about v. (2) If , the court eventually fullyC ≤ L/2
learns, .lim a p lim b p vtr t tr t
Proof sketch. For full learning to take place in the limit (i.e., , ), ita r v b r vt t
must be that whenever . On the contrary, learning stops ifa ( b W ( Rt t t t
. By proposition 1G, , and hence anda ba p b m p m p 0 V(W , R ) ! V(a , R )t t t t t t t t
whenever . Furthermore, the last five terms on theV(W , R ) ! V(W , b ) W ( Rt t t t t t
right-hand side of (A4) and (A5) are bounded and converge to zero as R t
converges to zero. Thus, (A4) and (A5) imply that there exists a positiveWt
constant M such that
F(a ) F(W )t tM(R W ) 1 C L 1 0,t t F(R ) F(W )t t
F(R ) F(b )t tM(R W ) 1 C L 1 0,t t F(R ) F(W )t t
as long as . Adding up, we obtainR ( Wt t
F(b ) F(a )t t2M(R W ) 1 2C L 1 1 0. (A6)t t [ ]F(R ) F(W )t t
Suppose and, contrary to the proposition, learning never stops (C 1 L/2 a (t
for all t). Then it must be that , and (A6) implies thatb lim R W p 0t tr t t
, a contradiction. This shows2C L p lim L{[F(a ) F(b )]/[F(R ) F(W )]} ≤ 0tr t t t t
that if , the law converges without the court fully learning.C 1 L/2
Now suppose . Note that (A6) cannot be satisfied when becauseC ≤ L/2 a p bt t
it cannot be that . Hence, in such a case, learning never stops. QED2C L 1 0
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